Abstract. This paper gives new examples that exploit the idea of using sparse polynomials with restricted coefficients over a finite ring for designing fast, reliable cryptosystems and identification schemes.
Overview
The idea of using polynomials with restricted coefficients in cryptography, though fairly new, has already found several cryptographic applications such as the NTRU cryptosystem [10] , the ENROOT cryptosystem [6] , the PASS identification scheme [9, 11] , and the SPIFI identification scheme [2] ; see also [8] .
In contrast to the constructions of NTRU and PASS, which consider classes of low-degree polynomials with many "small" nonzero coefficients, ENROOT and SPIFI are based on the use of polynomials of high degree that are extremely sparse. Although these latter constructions were originally considered only over finite fields, in this paper we improve and extend the ideas of [2, 6] and show that both ENROOT and SPIFI can be generalized to the setting of an arbitrary finite ring. In this generality, the user can be assured of an extra degree of security by selecting rings in which the problem of solving polynomial equations is notoriously difficult, as in the case of the residue ring for an RSA-modulus M = pl, where p and l are two privately held primes. In this paper, we have also introduced several new security features for the ENROOT and SPIFI protocols. Quite recently several powerful attacks on the original versions of ENROOT and SPIFI and some of their modifications have been presented in [1] . In particular the present version is a result of our iterative, thanks to many fruitful discussions with the authors of [1] ) attempts to make ENROOT and SPIFI resistant to attacks of the types described in [1] . Although we believe that there is no immediate "danger", it still seems that these attacks still present a serious threat to ENROOT and SPIFI. Nevertheless, these objects, sparse polynomials, look too nice and natural (easy to evaluate but hard to invert) not to try to use them for a public key cryptography. We hope that our paper may help to bring more attention to this area.
Notation and Definitions
Throughout this paper, log z denotes the binary logarithm of z.
Let R be an arbitrary finite ring, and let N denote a fixed multiple of the exponent exp(R × ) of the multiplicative group of units R × ; thus we have a N +1 = a for all a ∈ R × ∪ {0}. To illustrate our ideas below, we will sometimes consider two important special cases, which we refer to as the "IF q -case" and the "Z Z M -case." In the IF q -case, R is the finite field IF q with q elements, and we can take N = exp(R × ) = q − 1. In the Z Z m -case, R is the ring Z Z/M Z Z of residue classes with respect to an RSA modulus M = pl, where p and l are primes. In this case, we can either take N = ϕ(M ) = (p − 1)(l − 1), where ϕ is the Euler function, or N = λ(M ) = lcm(p − 1, l − 1) (λ is the Carmichael function). We remark that in all of these cases, we have log |R| ≈ log |R × | ≈ log N , We also assume that any element of R can be encoded by using about log |R| bits.
Let d be a fixed positive integer. Given a set S ⊆ R, we say that a polynomial
An expression of the form ax
we call a monomial with the coefficient a and the exponent (e 1 , . . . , e d ).
Finally, we say that a polynomial f (x 1 , . . . ,
3 The SPIFI Identification Scheme
In this section, we describe a generalization of SPIFI (for Secure Polynomial IdentiFIcation; see [2] ) for an arbitrary finite ring R. For the sake of simplicity and practicality, we work only with polynomials of a single variable (that is, d = 1).
A Hard Problem
The hard problem underlying our one-way functions can be stated as follows:
Given 2m arbitrary elements α 1 , . . . α m , β 1 , . . . , β m ∈ R and a set S ⊆ R of small cardinality, it is not feasible to find a τ -sparse S-polynomial f (x) ∈ R[x] of degree deg(f ) ≤ N with f (α j ) = β j for each j = 1, . . . , m, provided that N is of "medium" size relative to the choices of m ≥ 1, the cardinality |S|, and τ ≥ 3.
More precisely, we expect that if one fixes the number of points m, the cardinality |S|, and the sparsity τ ≥ 3, then the problem requires exponential time as N → ∞ (that is, exponential with respect to the bit length of N ).
For example, let p be a prime, and consider the case where R is the finite field IF p with p elements. Let a ij ≡ α i j (mod p) and b j ≡ β j (mod p) be chosen so that 0 ≤ a ij , b j ≤ p − 1 for i = 0, . . . , p − 1 and j = 1, . . . , m. Then in this simplified situation, the hard problem above is still equivalent to the problem of finding a feasible solution to the integer programming problem
where y j ∈ Z Z, x i ∈ S, and ε i ∈ {0, 1} for all i and j.
Basic Idea
We fix the ring R and some integer parameters k ≥ 1 and r, s, t ≥ 3. This information is made public. The value of N may be kept private. Only Alice needs this value, so in this scenario the choice of the ring R (and the value of N ) can be made by Alice.
In addition we require that R contains elements of multiplicative order in the interval [0.5N 1/4 , 2N 1/4 ]. This certainly imposes some additional number theoretic requirements on N which in practice are easy to satisfy.
To create the signature Alice uses the following algorithm, which we still denote by SPIFI.
Initial Set-up
Step 1
Select at random k distinct elements a 0 , . . . a k−1 ∈ R × where a 0 of multiplicative order in the interval [0.
Step 3
Then f is a t-sparse {0, 1, A}-polynomial with deg(f ) ≤ N , and f (a 0 ) = 0. The polynomial f is the private key.
Step 4
Compute C j = f (a j ) for j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Step 5
Publish the set of values {A, a 0 , . . . a k−1 , C 1 , . . . , C k−1 } as the public key.
To verify Alice's identity, Alice and Bob use the following procedure.
Verification Protocol
Step 1 Alice selects a random r-sparse {0, 1}-polynomial g(x) ∈ R[x] with deg(g) ≤ N and g(0) = 0, computes
and sends the sum
Bob selects a random s-sparse {0, 1, B}-polynomial h(x) ∈ R[x] of degree deg(h) ≤ N and sends h to Alice. Here B = 0, 1 or A.
Step 3
Alice computes
and sends the polynomial F and {D 1 , . . . , D k−1 } to Bob.
Step 4
Bob computes
and verifies that
and that F (x) is an rst-sparse {0, 1, A, B, AB}-polynomial with deg(F ) ≤ N , F (a 0 ) = 0, and
Of course, there is a chance that the constructed polynomial F (x) is not a {0, 1, A, B, AB}-polynomial; however, if rst is substantially smaller than N , then this chance is negligible (and in this case, Alice and Bob can repeat the procedure).
Efficiency
The sparsity of the polynomials involved guarantees computational efficiency for this scheme. Using (naive) repeated squaring, one can compute the power a e for any a ∈ R and 0 ≤ e ≤ N in about 2 log N arithmetic operations in R in the worst case, or about 1.5 log N arithmetic operations "on average"; see Section 1.3 of [3] , Section 4.3 of [4] , or Section 2.1 of [5] . Consequently, any
of degree at most N can be evaluated at any point in about O(τ log N ) arithmetic operations in R.
We recall that any element of R can be encoded by using about log |R| bits. Finally, we remark that if 0 ∈ S ⊆ R, then any τ -sparse S-polynomial f (x) ∈ R[x] of degree at most N can be encoded with about τ log(N |S| − N ) bits. To do this, we have to identify at most τ positions at which f has a nonzero coefficient. The encoding of each position requires about log N bits, and for each such position, about log(|S| − 1) bits are then required to determine the corresponding element of S.
For example, the signature must encode rst positions of the polynomial F (corresponding to its nonzero coefficients), which takes about rst log N bits. Each position requires two additional bits to distinguish between the possible nonzero coefficients 1, A, B and AB. The encoding of D 1 , . . . , D k−1 and their sum D requires about k log |R| bits. Hence the total signature size is about rst log(4N ) + k log |R| bits.
Putting everything together, after simple calculations we derive that (using the naive repeated squaring exponentiation)
• the initial set-up takes O(kt log N ) arithmetic operations in R;
• the private key size is about t log(2N ) bits;
• the public key size is about k(log |R| + log |R × |) bits; • signature generation, that is, computation of the polynomial F , elements 
We remark that the practical and asymptotic performance of the SPIFI scheme can be improved if one uses more sophisticated algorithms to evaluate powers and sparse polynomials; see [3-5, 13, 15] . In particular, one can use precomputation of certain powers of the a j , j = 1, . . . , k −1, and several other clever tricks which we do not consider in this paper.
Possible Attacks
It is clear that recovering or faking the private key (that is, finding a t-sparse {0, 1, A}-polynomial polynomial f (x) ∈ R[x] with f (a 0 ) = 0 and f (a j ) = C j for j = 1, . . . , k − 1) or faking the signature (that is, finding a rst-sparse {0, 1, A, B, AB}-polynomial F (x) ∈ R[x] with F (a 0 ) = 0 and F (a j ) = C j D j E j for j = 1, . . . , k − 1) are versions of the hard problem mentioned in Section 3.1 (with slightly different parameters).
We also remark that that without the reduction
one of the one possible attacks might be via polynomial factorization. In a practical implementation of this scheme, one should make sure that both f and g have terms of degree greater than N/2 so there are some reductions. Even without the reduction modulo x N +1 − x, the factorization attack does not seem to be feasible because of the large degrees of the polynomials involved; all known factorization algorithms (as well as their important components such as irreducibility testing and the greatest common divisor algorithms) do not take advantage of sparsity or any special structure of the coefficients; see [4, 14] . Moreover, the first factor that any of these algorithms will find would be the trivial one, that is, (x − a 0 ). But the quotient F (x)/(x− a 0 ) is most likely neither sparse nor an S-polynomial for any small set S. Finally, we remark that if one works in the setting of a ring R that is not a field (such as the Z Z M -case), then the problem of factorization becomes much more complicated, so this type of attack is even less likely to succeed.
It is possible that by using some "clever" choice of polynomials h, after several rounds of identification, Bob might be able to gain some information about f . But the polynomials g are specifically designed to prevent him from doing this. In Section 3.5 below, we present another idea which should render this attack completely infeasible, at least in the IF q -case.
One might also consider lattice attacks. In particular, one can try to select a rt-sparse {0, 1, A}-polynomial e(X) ∈ R[x] with e(a 0 ) = 0, compute
and then send these values together with
to the verifier. In principal this attack could succeed but finding such a polynomial e is kind of knapsack problem and since the dimension of the corresponding lattice would be equal to the (very large) degree N of the polynomials involved, any such attack seems completely infeasible at this time. With current technology, one can reduce lattices of degrees only in the hundreds, while in a practical implementation of this scheme our lattices will have dimension N of much large order of magnitude. Another attempt to construct such a polynomial e could be via solving the discrete logarithm in R to base a 0 , see [1] . However because a 0 is selected to be of small order this attack is very unlikely to succeed either. There is also another way to avoid the above attack via constructing a rtsparse {0, 1, A}-polynomial e(X) ∈ R[x] with e(a 0 ) = 0. This way does not require any restrictions of the order of a 0 and thus can be used for arbitrary N . Namely we request that for each of the polynomials f (x), g(x) and h(x) the sum of the degrees of the monomials is divisible by N . In this case the same condition also holds for F (x). Indeed, if an s-sparse polynomial and a t-sparse polynomial have monomials of degrees n 1 , . . . , n s and m 1 , . . . , m t , respectively, with
then their product has st monomials n i + m j , i = 1, . . . , s, j = 1, . . . , t (unless a collision occurs which is very unlikely). Then
as claimed. Therefore the aforementioned discrete logarithm attack from [1] is very unlikely (with probability about 1/N ) to produce a polynomial e(x) which besides the aforementioned conditions also has the sum of the degrees of the monomials which is divisible by N . We remark that, although using composite moduli may add some additional security features, the security of the SPIFI scheme is not compromised even if the factorization of M is known. In fact, we believe that even in the case where the modulus is a (sufficiently large) prime (that is, in the IF q -case), the scheme is still very secure.
It has turned out that Alice must make some commitment about the values of D 1 , . . . , D k−1 before she receives the polynomial h from Bob, otherwise there is a very simple attack on this scheme. On the other hand, sending the whole set to Bob before he selects his polynomial h may open some ways of attacking for "cheating" verifier. Sending the sum D = D 1 + . . . + D k−1 is just one of many possible ways for Alice undertake some commitments about the values of D 1 , . . . , D k−1 (just reducing the probability of the aforementioned "on-line" attack to 1/N ). Probably a more practical way would be just sending about a half of the bits of D 1 , . . . , D k−1 at Step 1 (instead of computing and sending D) and then sending the rest of the bits at Step 3 (just reducing the probability of the aforementioned "on-line" attack to about N −(k−1)/2 ). Moreover, the SPIFI scheme is easily modified so that the value N = ϕ(M ) or λ(M ) (see Section 2) remains secret. Indeed, Alice can choose g in Step 1 of the verification protocol so that the reduction modulo x N +1 −x that occurs in Step 3 produces a polynomial whose degree is not "too close" to N. In fact, "on average" it should be about N (1−1/2rst) for the SPIFI scheme and about N (1−1/2R) for the ENROOT scheme (see Section 4 below) since the corresponding polynomials are rst-sparse and R-sparse, respectively. Thus, in the case that N = ϕ(M ), the degree of F gives a worse approximation to N than the value of M itself, at least if M = pl is a product of two primes of the same order.
Modification of the Basic Scheme
In this subsection, we consider only the case of a finite field R = IF q . It is very likely, however, that these ideas can be generalized to the setting of an arbitrary ring.
In order to prevent Bob from gaining any useful information about f by selecting certain special polynomials h, Alice can initially construct two polynomials f 1 and f 2 , either one of which can serve as her private key. That is, for some A, C 1 , . . . , C k−1 ∈ IF q with A = 0, 1 and distinct a 0 , . . . , a k−1 ∈ IF × q , Alice can find two t-sparse {0, 1, A}-polynomials f 1 (x), f 2 (x) ∈ IF q [x] of degree at most N that satisfy
for some C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C k−1 ∈ IF q . To do this, Alice selects a certain parameter n and considers certain random {±1, ±A}-polynomials ψ(x) of degree 4n, looking for roots in IF × q . For values of n of reasonable size this can be done quite efficiently, at least in probabilistic polynomial time; see [4, 14] .
It follows from Theorem 3 of [12] that for sufficiently large q, the probability that a random monic polynomial of degree 4n over IF q will have k + 1 distinct roots in IF q is given by
In particular,
Letting A vary randomly over IF q /{0, 1}, Alice considers {±1, ±A}-polynomials ψ(x) ∈ IF q [x] of degree 4n which have n coefficients of each type 1, −1, A or −A. Since
is large, after O((k + 1)!e k+1 ) trials Alice will find with high probability such a polynomial with k + 1 distinct roots a 0 , . . . , a k ∈ IF q . By reordering if necessary, we can assume that a 0 , . . . , a k−1 are distinct elements in the multiplicative group IF × q . Alice now writes ψ(x) = ϕ 1 (x)− ϕ 2 (x) where ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 are 2n-sparse {0, 1, A}-polynomials of degree at most 4n + 1, and each ϕ i has n coefficients of each type 1 or A. Moreover, ϕ 1 = ϕ 2 , but clearly
with deg(ψ 1 ) ≤ q − 1 and ψ 1 (a 0 ) = 0. Alice then selects a random (⌊t/2⌋− n)-sparse {0, 1}-polynomial ψ 2 (x) ∈ IF q [x] with deg(ψ 2 ) ≤ q − 1. Assuming that ψ 1 and ψ 2 have been selected so that the non-constant monomials that occur in them have degree greater than 4n + 1, Alice can now define
Then f 1 and f 2 are t-sparse {0, 1, A}-polynomials in the correct form for the SPIFI protocol, and they satisfy (1) some C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C k−1 ∈ IF q We remark that in this case the value C 0 = f 1 (a 0 ) = f 2 (a 0 ) must be published as well (although the scheme can easily be modified in such a way that as before f 1 (a 0 ) = f 2 (a 0 ) = 0 thus this value need not be sent). Now Alice can alternate between f 1 and f 2 in a random order to confound Bob's attempts to gain useful information about the private key.
It is easy to see that instead of the sum Aψ 1 (x) + ψ 2 (x) + ϕ i (x) for i = 1, 2, one can also consider more complicated expressions involving {0, 1}-polynomials. For example, one can put
for appropriately chosen {0, 1}-polynomials ψ 1 (x), ψ 2 (x) and ϕ(x).
Remarks
It is natural to try to construct and utilize more than two t-sparse {0, 1, A}-polynomials that take the same values at k distinct points. However our approach of Section 3.5 does not seem to extend to this case. Although we have not done so here, it can be interesting to extend our construction to multivariate polynomials.
The ENROOT Cryptosystem
In this section, we describe a generalization of ENROOT (for ENcryption with ROOTs; see [6] ) for an arbitrary finite ring R. We will now consider polynomials in R[x 1 , . . . , x d ], where d ≥ 2 is fixed. Accordingly, we will often employ vector notation, writing
Another Hard Problem
Our one-way functions are based on the following hard problem:
of degree at most N , it is not feasible to find an element a = (a 1 , . . . , a d ) ∈ R d with f j (a) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , d, provided that N is sufficiently large relative to the choices of d ≥ 2 and τ ≥ 3.
Again, we expect that if one fixes the number d ≥ 2 and the sparsity τ ≥ 3, then the problem requires exponential time as N → ∞ (see Section 4.4 below).
Basic Idea
We fix the ring R and the integers d > ℓ ≥ 3, s j , t j ≥ 3, j = 1, . . . , d such that t 1 = . . . = t ℓ . This information is made public. The value of N may be kept private. In fact, only Bob needs this value so in this scenario the choice of the ring R (and thus the value of N ) is made by Bob.
The algorithm ENROOT can be described as follows.
ENROOT Algorithm
Step 1 Alice selects d random elements a 1 , . . . , a d ∈ R × which form her private key.
Step 2
Alice selects d random polynomials
, of degree at most |R|, containing at most t j − 1 monomials, j = 1, . . . , d, such that the first ℓ polynomials h 1 (x), . . . , h ℓ (x) have the same set E of exponents of their monomials.
Step 3
Alice publishes the polynomials f j (x) = h j (x) − h j (a) for j = 1, . . . , d as her public key, where a is the vector (
To send a message m ∈ R, Bob selects d random polynomials g j (x) ∈ R[x] of degree at most N , containing at most s j − 1 monomials such that one monomial has an exponent from the set E and having nonzero constant coefficients. Bob then computes the reduction F (x) of the polynomial
modulo the ideal in R[x] generated by {x
and he sends F (x) to Alice.
Step 5 To decrypt the message, Alice simply computes F (a) = m.
Efficiency
The sparsity of the polynomials involved again provides computational efficiency for this scheme. Using repeated squaring, one can compute the monomial a e1
We remark that any τ -sparse polynomial f (x) ∈ R[x] of degree at most |R| can be encoded with about τ ((d + 1) log |R|) bits. To do this, we have to identify at most τ monomials for which f has a nonzero coefficient. The encoding of each monomial x Let us set
Then after simple calculations we derive that (using the naive repeated squaring exponentiation)
• generation of the public key: to produce the vector a requires O(d log |R|) random bits; to construct the polynomials h j (x) requires the generation of another ( arithmetic operations in R.
In the IF q -case, the above scheme can be accelerated if Alice sets e 1 = 1, selects a random element a ∈ R × and d − 1 random exponents e 2 , . . . , e d ∈ Z Z/(q − 1)Z Z, and defines a as (a e1 , . . . , a e d ) ∈ (R × ) d . Again we mention that the performance of the ENROOT algorithm can be improved if one uses more sophisticated algorithms to evaluate powers and sparse polynomials; see [3-5, 13, 15] .
Another possible way to improve performance is to use at Step 4 only k < d randomly selected polynomials from the set {f 1 , . . . , f d }. For the same level of security, there will be a trade-off between the complexity of Step 2 (hence the size of the private key) and the complexity of Step 4.
Security Considerations
The obvious way to attack the ENROOT cryptosystem is to try to find a simultaneous solution to the system of polynomial equations
which amounts to solving the hard problem in Section 4.1. All known algorithms to solve systems of polynomial equations of total degree n require (regardless of sparsity) an amount of time that is polynomial in n (that is, exponential time with respect to the bit length of n); see [7, 14] . Since the degrees of the polynomials in (2) will be very large in practical implementations (about the size of N ), this attack is totally infeasible.
Another possibility is to simply "guess" a solution. One expects that a system of τ -sparse polynomial equations in d variables of high degree over R will have very few zeros if d ≥ 2, even though the number of zeros of a polynomial over an arbitrary ring is not necessarily bounded by the degree. Working heuristically, if we view the vector of polynomials f (x) = (f 1 (x) , . . . , f d (x)) as defining a "random" map f : R d → R d , then the expected number of roots common to all of the polynomials f j (x) (that is, the cardinality of the kernel of f ) is given by
hence this brute force attack will take roughly 0.245|R| d trials "on average" to succeed. For arbitrary rings, we expect the choice d ≥ 2 will provide the 2 90 level of security against this attack if N is at least 50 bits long.
Although it is tempting to choose d = ℓ = 1, in this case there are more sophisticated attacks that provide some information about Alice's private key. One of these is based upon consideration of the difference set of the powers of monomials occurring in the polynomial F (x). Indeed, if
are the polynomials selected by Alice and Bob, respectively, with n 1 = m 1 = 0 (and such that the sets {n 1 , . . . , n t } and {m 1 , . . . , m s } have a reasonably large intersection) then F (x) contains at most τ ≤ st monomials C ν x rν , where
for some i = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , s. Consequently, finding the repeated elements in the difference set
may reveal some information about the polynomial f (x). In addition, if d = 1, one can also compute the greatest common divisor of f (x) with x N +1 − x. Since this polynomial will have lower degree than f in general, it would be easier to find a root from a theoretical standpoint. Although it is not clear how to do this in an amount of time that is polynomial in the sparsity rather than in the degree of f (x), it remains a potential threat.
On the other hand, these attacks on ENROOT fail when d > ℓ ≥ 2. Indeed, the first attack may help to gain some information about the total set of monomials in all of the polynomials f 1 , . . . , f d , but it does not provide any information about the individual polynomials since it is impossible to determine which monomial comes from which product f j g j , j = 1, . . . , d. In order to try all possible partitions into d groups of s j t j monomials, j = 1, . . . , d, needs to examine P = R ! (s 1 t 1 hence the number P of combinations to consider grows exponentially with respect to all parameters, provided that d > ℓ ≥ 2. The second attack fails as well since the notion of greatest common divisor for multivariate polynomials is not defined, and taking resolvents to reduce to one variable is too costly.
However the case d = 2 is still not secure. Indeed, in this case we have either d = ℓ = 2 or ℓ = 1. In either case there are very simple linear algebra attacks which do not apply when d > ℓ ≥ 2 which we believe to be completely secure against the aforementioned attacks. There are some other alternative ways to guarantee that there are sufficiently many common elements in the sets of exponents of monomials of f 1 , . . . , f d . In particular, the first few monomials of each polynomial h 1 , . . . , h d can be selected the same exponents.
Finally, we remark that the ENROOT cryptosystem is probably secure against lattice attacks for the same reason that the SPIFI scheme is secure (see Section 3.4): most lattice attacks would necessarily be based on lattices of dimension equal to the cardinality of |R|, and in practical implementations this number would be very large.
Remarks
The ENROOT cryptosystem is well-suited to private key sharing among multiple parties. For parameter choices and approximate runtimes in the IF q -case, we refer the reader to [6] . The main inherent weakness of this cryptosystem is its high message expansion cost. It is likely that working over certain noncommutative rings or rings that are not principal ideal domains may improve the overall security, so that smaller rings could be employed. Working over these rings, it would be interesting to have a more thorough security analysis than we have attempted here.
